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FORUM
FASTEN YOUR SEAT BELTS
Alan R. Bender
Thinking outside the box is anathema to the 75-year-old U.S. airline business. This seriously palsied industry will need
to rethink strategy if it is going to survive unpunished after the dust settles fiom recent merger talks and customer
service calamities.
Essentially all deregulation era airline inhustry studies indicate that the traditional U.S. air carriers--the American's,
t o life due only to marketing prowess, government protectionism, and airport gate
Delta's, and United'-ling
monopolization. Their existence certainly isn't a function of their service product-which grows measurably worse
by the day. Indeed, today's airline product borders on garbage, and that reality can cost the carriers terribly. Even a
commodity business like air transportation is vulnerable to customer rebellion. The only question is "When?"
During the 20+ years of deregulation the older airlines
have succeed& only in building very shaky survival
strategies. Unable to function-as other commodity
businesses do--by managing unit costs, traditional air
carriers compete by developing elaborate pricing
mechanisms (highly discriminatory fares), sophisticated
kickback schemes (fiequent flier programs), and
monopolistic infrastructure strangleholds (airport hubs).
The old airlines have little choice; their intractablesize and
inflexiblelabor agreements doom them to focusing on the
revenue side of the house, an exceptionally problematical
strategy in a commodity business.
Who would posit a business calamity while U.S. air
carriers enjoy near-full planes and very respectableprofits?
I would. Severe problems commonly occur when an
industry ignores public opinion and immerses itself in
denial. Big tobacco provides a case in point. .
The deplorable state of America's air transportation
system is mainly the fault of the carriers, but no one would
know it by the sound bites emanating fiom the airlines'
public relations departments. Flights always late? Blame
the FAA. Meals inedible? Blame discount f$res. Ticket
prices too high? Blame OPEC. Customers drunk and
unruly? Blame society. Frankly, that kind of hubris puts
Microsoft to shame.
Let's face facts,this is 1960sera GM, Ford, and Chrysler
masqueradiig as today's United, American, and Delta.
The problem is, without the airline equivalents of Toyota,
Honda, and Mercedes in the U.S. aviation marketplace-it
is illegal for foreign air carriers to operate within the United
States--the big airlines have nary a care in the world.
Their only serious initations come fiom occasional
skirmishes with pint-size upstart carriers and some fancy
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dancing around low cost colossus Southwest Airlines.
Frankly, this is American business at its worst: closed
markets, strong-armed labor unions, and locked-up
infiastrudure all rolled into one. Someoneplease wake me
up and tell me this isn't 1950!
Proposed couplings such as the United-US Airways deal
are so manifestly threatening as to beg for the immediate
legalization of cabotage: domestic flying by foreign
carriers. Singapore Airlines, for example, can and would
bring the big U.S. carriers to their knees in many domestic
air markets includingNew York-Los Angeles and Chicage
San Francisco. At the very least the celebrated Asian
carrier would embarrass the U.S. bullies into substantially
improving the quality of their domestic service product.
Even if cabotage were never to become afait accompli7the
controversy emanating fiom its serious discussion on
Capitol Hill would force the airline industry's neck-deep
muck to the surhct+an
absolute necessity given public
wrath over the state of air transportation in the United
states.
Regrettably, insouciance has been a trademark of U.S.
airline firms since at least the 1930s. Deregulation was
supposed to transport the traditional air carriers-kicking
and screaming--to a new reality, but instead it is the
American public begging for mercy. Chalk one up for big
business.
Still, industry maverick Southwest Airlines-and its
canny record of success-provides evidence that satisfied
customers, respectable profits, and happy employeesare not
mutually exclusive properties in the airline business.
Conversely, the persistence of the old economy megacarriers demonstrates that even highly inefficient
companies are a whole lot smarter than government
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policymakers. And one thing is absolutely certain: Airline
deregulation would have been a slam dunk failure long ago
were it not far Southwest Airlines' inestimable presence in
the domestic marketplace.
Which leads us back to the inseparable issues of merger
mania and the future of the U.S. airline industry. Can
inefficient tirms survive primarily by abusing and
overcharging the public? Ofthey can,though none
of the big airlines would have had that awlid capacity were
it not for Washington's long-standing record of complicity
and incompetence.
Once again the ball is in the iovernment's court.
Unethical practices can be exposed, fi-ozen infi-astructure
can be thawed, and federal protection can be removed once
and for all. Many of these remedies-along with
others-were
outlined in a recent National Research
Council Special Report.
In the meantime, passengers-pecially
business
people--can vote with both their hands and their feet.

They can contact their elected representativesand tell them
that they are fed u p ' with poor airline service and
unnecessarily discriminatory fares. And they can throw
some business in the direction ofsmall upstart carriers even
if that means losing a few fiequent flier perks in the
process. Some folks might even consider the fractional
ownership of corporate aircraft-or
even
"telecommuting"-whenever thoseoptionsappear h i b l e .
The U.S. air carriers' self-serving media blitz isn't
fooling anyone. It is already clear to most passengers that
the big airlines don't give a hoot about providing a decent
product at a fair price; the carriers are interested only in
grandiose empire building and, of course, their allimportant attachmentsto Washington's protectionist apron
strings. Once carriers fully comprehendthe swellingpublic
outrage they will almost certainly recant their merger
initiatives-at least for now. A word to Congress: h 7 tlet
them off so easily this time.0
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